OB Research Seminar - Lukas von Flüe, HEC Lausanne

Individuals vary greatly in how they respond to information about the choices of others, which can significantly influence the effects of policy interventions aimed at changing harmful norms. Yet, our understanding of this heterogeneity in social learning and its impact on evolutionary dynamics remains nascent. Here, an agent-based model is used to study social norm change. This model is unique in allowing agents to simultaneously utilise different types of information, unlike traditional models that assume universal conformism. The dynamics of social norm change are modelled with a coordination game in which agents choose between maintaining the status quo and adopting an alternative norm. The initial choice distribution assumes that the status quo forms the initial coordination equilibrium, even though coordinating on the alternative norm would yield a higher payoff for each agent. In other words, the population is assumed to be stuck in a harmful equilibrium. Various policy measures are examined, all aiming to initiate endogenous change toward the alternative norm. Expanding traditional models of norm change to include diverse learning strategies beyond simple conformism enables the study of a wider range of policy interventions. The results show that the effectiveness of these measures depends on the distribution of learning strategies and the targeted group of agents. Crucially, due to heterogeneity in social learning, a step-wise intervention is more likely to be successful than a one-time intervention.