Eco‑responsible  images

Image compression reduces page weight and loading times.

Read more about it

Search in
Séminaire Economie Recherche Public Economics and Policy

Public Economics and Policy Seminar - Raphaël Franck (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Safety Last? Political Supervision of Bureaucratic Performance and Worker Safety in French Mines during the Industrial Revolution

Published on 22 Aug 2024
Audience
Activities for everyone
Place
Internef, 149
Format
On site

This study analyzes whether democracy changes the career incentives of civil servants. By focusing on the promotion of the engineers who worked in the mining administration in France between 1865-1913, where mines were privately owned and managed but production and safety were supervised by the State because of tax purposes, the results show that democracy has no impact on the number of deaths or the death rate per worker but adds one element to the promotion of engineers, besides seniority: the death rate per worker become a major determinant of promotion after 1875, when democracy was finally established. This effect is explained by two factors. First, promotions are driven by the timing of the elections to the lower house of Parliament. Second, the occupations, but not the ideology, of the politicians explain the post-1875 effect. In particular, Catholic and Protestant clergymen in both the lower and upper houses of Parliament have a negative effect on the promotion of engineers who supervise local mines with many mortal accidents.


Organization

View more events